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PROPOSED PROCEDURAL REFORM
HUGH E. WUIIMS*
PROCEDURAL ACT
An act to abolish the present and to provide a new system of legal
precedure both civil and criminal, by authorizing the Supreme Court
to prescribe forms and rules, and generally to regulate pleading, evi-
dence, and practice.
Be it enacted by the Legislative assembly of the State of
Section 1. SUPREME COURT TO MlAEE RULEs. The Supreme Court
of this state shall have the power to prescribe by rule from time to
time and in any manner, the forms of writs and all other process; the
mode and manner of framing and filing proceedings and pleadings;
of giving notice and serving writs and process of all kinds; of taking
and obtaining evidence, drawing up, entering and enrolling orders;
and generally to regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for and the
kind and character of the entire procedure, including pleading, evi-
dence, and practice, to be used in all actions, motions and proceedings
of whatever nature in both civil and criminal trials by the various
courts of this state. Separate rules shall be made for civil and for
criminal procedure.
Section 2. RULEs OF LEGAL PROCEDURE. The rules of legal pro-
cedure in this state shall be such rules as may thus be adopted by the
Supreme Court of this state; provided, that
(a) SiMPiFicATioN OF RuLs. In prescribing such rules the
Supreme Court shall have regard to the simplification of the system of
pleading, evidence, practice, and procedure in said courts, so as to pro-
mote a speedy determination of litigation on the merits.
(b) PLEADING. All rules of pleading in civil actions shall be
based upon the principle of giving notice of the opposing claims of
the respective parties, sufficient to apprise them and the court of the
nature thereof (notice pleading). They shall not be based on the
principle of requiring a complete allegation of all the ultimate facts
which must be proved at the trial in order to establish such claims
(issue or essential fact pleading).
(c) PRACTICE: TRIAL COURT. Every step in the trial of a case
shall be taken under the direction and supervision of the court; and
the judge shall help to empanel the jury, shall elicit evidence by ques-
tions to witnesses, shall instruct the jury upon the law, and may ad-
vise the jury upon the creditability or weight of the evidence. The
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
ILLINOIS LAW QUARTERLY
judge shall have power to select, summon, and place on the stand
witnesses not called by the parties. Experts shall be called by the
Court instead of by litigants, and the expense thereof shall be included
as apart of the trial costs.
(d) PRACTICE: SUPREME COURT. No case shall be reversed for
a violation of rules of court, or any other technicality, or ever re-
manded for a new trial if the first trial satisfies constitutional require-
ments, but the Supreme Court shall in such case always render final
judgment, and to that end it is empowered to correct any prejudicial
errors of the trial court, whether of procedure or of substantive law,
and to certify to the trial court for trial any question of fact on which
it has not power to take evidence.
(e) RuLES TO BE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH ACT. All the rules so
adopted by the Supreme Court shall not be inconsistent with any of
the terms of this Act or with the constitution of the state or of the
United States.
(f) FIRST RULEs. The rules of legal procedure in force at the
present times, whether statutory or common law rules, in-so-far as
they are not inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed as mandatory
rules and are constituted and declared to be operative as the first rules
of court for the appropriate courts of this state.
Section 3. EFFECT OF RuLEs. All rules of court formulated pur-
suant to this act, except as required by this act or the constitution of
the state, shall as to the courts be directory and not mandatory.
Section 4. DECISIONs NOT PRECEDENTS. A decision by any court
on a point of procedure, whether a point of pleading, evidence, prac-
tice or any other procedural matter shall never be regarded as a bind-
ing precedent for the decision of a procedural point in a later case.
The question whether any point is procedural or substantive shall
itself be regarded as procedural.
Section 5. REPEAL. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with
this act are hereby repealed. When and as the rules of court herein
authorized shall be promulgated, all rules in conflict therewith shall
be and become of no further force and effect.
The above is a copy for a Bill for the reform of the legal procedure
generally found at present in the states of the union by substituting
therefor what may be called modern procedural methods. The Bill
was drafted by the author of this article with the assistance of his law
faculty and other friends. It has already been introduced into the
legislature of North Dakota; it will be introduced into the next legis-
lature of the state of Minnesota; and perhaps the publicity given
herein may lead to its introduction in other states.
Before the act was drafted the plan of reform contained therein
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was submitted to Dean Roscoe Pound,1 of the Harvard University Law
School, to Dean Henry M. Bates,2 of the University of Mlichigan Law
School, and to Dean John H. Wigimore,3 of Northwestern University
Law School, and the author of Wigmore on Evidence, and all of these
men approved of the plan in its entirety.
After the act was drafted it was submitted to Professor C. B.
Whittier, of Leland Stanford Jr. University, an authority on Legal
Procedure, for suggestions and criticisms. Mr. Whittier made some
suggestions as to phraseology (which have been incorporated in the
Act) and then specifically approved of every section in the Act. The
Act was then submitted to the Hon. Elihu Root, the leader of the
American Bar to-day. He studied the entire Act and after rephras-
ing one section specifically approved of every section in the Act except
Section 2(b) and he said he was not opposed to this.4
I Dean Pound said: "I have looked over your plan carefully. The sev-
eral propositions advocated therein have for many years been advocated by
thoughtful lawyers in this country. The first proposition has repeatedly been
endorsed by the American Bar Association, and has been advocated by one of
its committees. An increasing number of state bar associations have also
been endorsing it. Also the New York Commission on Statutory Consodida-
tion has approved of it. I have no doubt that within a few years it will be
generally adopted in this country, and as you know it was adopted in England
in 1873.
"As to notice pleading, the attention of the profession has not been so
much drawn to this matter as to the first proposition, but here also a steady
movement has been going on for some time. I imagine that it would follow
necessarily from the adoption of the first proposition and that when pleadings
are governed by rules of court they will Inevitably change to the notice type."
2 Dean Bates said: "The changes which you propose in general I heartily
approve. In principle at least they have, of course, been tried elsewhere al-
ready, as you have indicated. Notice pleading seems to be successful in this
state. Declaratory judgments, which I think you do not specifically mention,
are on trial here, and while it is too early to speak with assurance, I have
little doubt of the success of this change. Certainly you are altogether right
in urging that courts themselves should make the great body of rules and
regulations governing procedure with only the general outline and general
limitations fixed by the legislature. Legislative interference in this matter
has been one of the crying ills in our procedural scheme, as you well point out.
"General simplicity of course must be sought if the courts are not to lose
ground steadily. Great advances have been made in this state, and while at
each change there is a howl from some members of the bar, the successive re-
forms have in the main been received in good spirit and every one of them is
now heartily approved."
8 Dean Wigmore said: "In general, I can say, without hesitation, that the
plan seems to me to be an admirable one."
4 Mr. Root phrased section 2 (c) of the Act, adding the clause in regard to
including the expense of experts as a part of the trial costs, and then said, "I
agree with the provisions of Section 1, and with Section 2, including provis-
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The purpose of the Act is to make legal procedure a means for
the administration of justice instead of an end in itself., To-day, as
always heretofore, legal procedure has been an end. We are litigating
procedure. Over one-half of the cases appealed involve no questions
except procedure. Attorneys may be interested in these questions,
but clients certainly are not. Society (and that means clients) is
complaining of the delays, uncertainties, technicalities and expense.6
All of these are due to the fact that so much time is spent in litigating
procedure. It is as though physicians should pay no attention to the
question of whether or not the medicines they prescribe are good for
their patients. Society would not tolerate such physicians. Attor-
neys do not ask whether or not their legal procedure is good for their
clients. Society is beginning to ask why there is this difference be-
tween physicians and attorneys. The above Procedural Act is planned
to stop this practice.
How will it accomplish this result? (1) By the requirement of
notice pleading instead of essential fact or issue pleading;7 (2) by
the requirement that the judges shall exercise greater control over the
conduct of trials ;8 (3) by the requirement that reversals for techni-
calities shall be abolished ;9 and (4) by the requirement that all rules
of legal procedure shall be directory rules formulated by the court
instead of mandatory, statutory, or common law rules.10 This program
of reform is supported by enlightened judgment and common sense.
It is necessary to satisfy the demands of justice and the spirit of fair
play. It is in harmony with all modern practice. English legal pro-
ions (a), (d), (e), and (f), and with Sections 3, 4, and 5." As to proviso (b)
under Section 2 he said, after referring to the reform of common law plead-
ing by code pleading, "Perhape a change in the direction of notice pleading
would be another improvement. Of course, the main purpose of pleading is
to give notice to the other side." His only doubt was whether or not, with
the rule making power in the courts, they would not in making rules as to
notice pleading gradually lead the practice back to the discarded system of
common law pleading. We think the danger to which Mr. Root refers is
safeguarded by Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.
5 Of course the problem of how to reform the administration of justice is
a fourfold problem and this is only one of the four parts of it. The other
parts are (1) how properly to organize the courts and thereby judicial bus-
ness; (2) how to obtain and retain the best judges; and (3) how to get Into
the legal profession the best possible attorneys. 13 School and Society 9.
6 American Bar Association Report (1887) Vol. X, p. 317 ff.; (1918) 12 Ill
L. Rev. 540.
2 Sec. 2 (b).
8 Sec. 2 (c).
9 Sec. 2 (d).
10 Sec. 1, Sec. 2 (a), (e), (f), Sec. 3, Sec. 4.
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eddure and legal procedure in the United States have been successful
only- in-so-far as they have adopted some or all of these principles.
(1) Probably code, or essential fact, pleading, while not as tech-
nieal as common law or issue pleading, has had much to do with rais-
ing mere procedural instead of substantive law points, and the sub-
stitution of notice pleading therefor would do as much as anything else
to correct this defect in our present system. The proof of this is the
statistics in regard to the work of the Chicago municipal court and3
the courts of Michigan, the English courts and the courts of other
countries where notice pleading obtains or has been adopted."'
(2) Another cause of the litigation of procedure instead of the
real disputes of clients is the power which attorneys have at the pres-
ent time over the conduct of cases in trial courts. The judge is elected
to control the trial of cases, but as a matter of fact, in most state courts,
the attorneys try the cases. The judge acts only as an umpire to de-
cide points of procedure, i. e., questions of violations of rules of the
game. He does not participate in the trial of the substantive ques-
tions. The result is that the litigant who has the better attorney
stands a better show of winning than the other litigant. Attorneys are
*always partial and are under the imperative duty of so being. In the
business of trying a case the only real chance for impartiality comes
from the intervention of the judge. It is better once in a while to
have a partial judge (whose work is subject to review by a higher
court) than never to have any impartiality in the court room. In
some cases, like marriage and divorce and probate cases, the court
should have the power to call and examine witnesses. The calling of
experts by the parties also has produced serious abuse, and has worked
to the confusion of juries, the disadvantage of litigants of slenddr
means and the discredit of experts. All of these defects can be cured
by investing the judge with much of the power now exercised by the
"I For such statistics as well as for full explanation of notice pleading aid
a presentation of the argunients therefor, see Whittier's Article thereon in
(1918) 31 Harm. L. Rev. 501. Mr. Whittier suggests the following as an ap-
propriate but the only necessary rule for the Supreme Court to formulate upon
the subject of notice Pleading. "Enough facts must be stated so that the olp-
#fteftt, With such knowledge as he already has, may understand What cause
6f Acti6n or defense the pleader is relying upon; if that is done no more can
bO rdquired. Thd trial court, or some officer thereof, shall determine when a
plading gives the required notide; and the trial court, in Its discretion, mAY
reuire a pleading sufficient to apprize the court of the cause of action or de-
fense relied upon, even though the opponent does not or cannot successfully
6bJect t6 the pleading."
Notice pleading is adapted, as issue and essential fact pleading are not,
t6 the growing litigation between groups of litigants, as in the Kansas Indug-
trial Court.
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attorneys. The success of the modern English system1 2 and of the
practice in the juvenile, municipal, some state district courts and
many federal courts and the procedure before the executive boards and
administrative tribunals of this country are abundant proof of this.
The attorney's objection is a selfish objection and it must yield to the
argument of the general good.
(3) Another fruitful cause of the litigation of mere procedure
is the abomination of new trials and reversals for technicalities and
the bandying of litigants back and forth from one court to another.13
All of this can be remedied by the requirment that the Supreme Court
shall render final judgment where the parties have had one constitu-
tional trial. In England the abuses above referred to are practically
unknown, and they have been abolished, not at the expense of justice,
but in the furtherance of it.14
(4) But the greatest cause of the litigation of legal procedure-
the rules for the trial of cases-instead of the real cases of litigants
is the fact that our rules of legal procedure are mandatory statutory
rules.
There have been three periods in the historical development of
legal procedure in the Anglo-American system.
The first period was that in which the common law judges built
12 In England, according to a recent report, out of fifty trials attended (five
of them murder cases), "it did not take longer to choose the jury than the few
minutes required to call their names and administer the oath. There was
not a single challenbe or objection. The same twelve jurors tried five sepa-
rate felony cases in one day. The presiding judge directed the proceedings
at'every stage and was the active controlling power throughout the trial. Of
his own initiative he called and examined witnesses. He permitted or re-
fused cross-examination in his own discretion. The evidence was introduced
according to the view of the judge rather than according to that of counsel.
He, in summing up, expressed his opinion in regard to the weight of the evi-
dence, commented on the- demeanor of witnesses, and even went further and
expressed his opinion in regard to guilt or innocence."
13 For striking illustrations of this proctice see Cox v. McLaughlin (1872)
44 Cal. 18, (1873) 47 Cal. 87, (1888) 76 Cal. 60, (1893) 99 Cal. 104; Hunicke v.
Meramee Quarry Co. (1919) 212 S.W. 345; Peterson v. Western Union Tel. 07.
(1898) 75 Minn. 368; Presley v. Bloomington etc. 'Co. (1916) :271 Ill. 622, 1 Am.
Jud. Soc. 7.;.Statev. Campbell (1907) 210 Mo. 202; Harwell v. State (1886) 22
Tex. App.. 251; Keller v. State (1878) 4 Tex. App. 527; Woolridge v. Stdt6
(1882) 13 Tex. App. 443; Lockett v.State (1918) 207 S.W. 55 (Ark.); (1919)
17 Mich. L. Rev. 406; State v. Court of Common Pleas (1918) 120 N.E. 335
(Oh.); State v. Garcia (1914) 143 Pac. 1012 (N. Mex.); Graham v. Consoli-
dated Traction Co. (1900) 65 N.J. L. Rep. 539; Murray v. Heinze, (1895) 17
Mont. 353; Lynch v. Sneed Iron Works (1909)-132 Ky. 241.-
14 Metropolitan etc. v. Wright (1886) 11 App. Cases 152; Commissioner etc.
v. Brown (1887) 13 App. Cases 133.
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up a body of rules of legal procedure through a system of precedents,
just as they built up a body of substantive law by a system of prece-
dents. In this period they developed the system of common law
pleading, the system of evidence, and the system of common law prac-
tice. The rules of legal procedure thus developed were just as im-
portant as the rules of substantive law. (The observance of them was
just as mandatory as the observance of the rules of substantive law.)
If any rule of pleading, evidence, or practice was violated that was as
fatal td a party's cause of action as would be any failure to show a
substantive cause of action. The consequence of this procedure was
that the courts more and more got into the habit of litigating mere
procedural points, as we are doing to-day. The situation finally got so
bad that a reform became imperative. The English people tried to
reform their common law procedure by the Hilary rules. The people
of the United States tried to reform their common law procedure by
the so-called code reform inaugurated by David Dudley Field.
The so-called code reform marks the second period in the develop-
ment of our legal procedure. It undertook to correct the evils of the
common law system by making the rules of legal procedure statutory
rules instead of common law rules. The only effect of this reform was
to make the rules a legislative matter instead of a judicial pnatter.
They remained as mandatory as they were under the common law
system. In fact, if possible, they became even more mandatory. Mak-
ing the rules statutory meant that they must be lived up to in every
respect, or it was reversible error. The result was that under the
code system procedural points were litigated .as much as under the
common law system. People have long seen that the code reform was
a mistake so far as the subject of legal procedure is concerned. There
was no advantage in making the rules of legal procedur6 legislative
rules instead -of judicial rules. In this respect the code reformers
were working on the wrong theory. The time has come when it is
necessary to abandon the code system of legal procedure. The prob-
lem is: How to give up the code system of legal procedure without
going back to the old common law system?
The third period in which the problem is being solved may be
called the period of modern legal procedure. England was the first
to inaugurate the work of reform in this period. This was done in
1873 and 1875.15 Since that time England's legal procedure has been
completely revolutionized. To-day England's legal procedure is a
real instrument for the administration of justice. There is little crit-
icism of it. The English people have discovered how to avoid the
mistakes made in the two first periods in the historical development
1 Chitty's English Statutes, pp. 640, 641, 650; 674.
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of legal procedure. The English system has now been tried for a
long enough period so that it is no longer an experiment. It has dem-
onstrated its success.1" It proves that all that we have to do to correct
the defects in our system, due to the fact that our rules are manda-
tory statutory rules, is to adopt the English system. To do this the
formulation of the rules of legal procedure must be taken away from
the legislature arid given to the Supreme Court, and such rules when
formulated must be directory in nature as to the courts and decisions
thereon, must not be governed by the principle of stare decisis.
In the United States very little comparatively has been done in
the way of inaugurating a modern reform of legal procedure further
than criticisms of the code and common law systems, the adoption of
resolutions favoring a new system and the writing of law articles upon
programs of modern legal procedure.' 7 The American Bar Associa-
tion has gone on record a number of times in favor of a system prac-
tically like the modern English system. A number of state bar asso-
ciations have done the same thing. The United States Supreme Court
has inaugurated a reform of this sort for the trial of cases on the
equity side of the court, and there is now a bill before Congress to
authorize the United States Supreme Court to formulate the same
sort of rules for the common law side of the court. New Jersey,'8
Colorado, 9 Alabama, 0 Michigan, 21 Vermont,2 Virginia,' 3 and New
York, 24 have adopted practice acts which are long steps in this direc-
tion. The Association of American Law Schools has authorized the
publication by a committee of the Association of a Source Book con-
taining all of the materials on modern legal procedure. The American
Judicature Society has drafted a number of model procedural acts on
various branches of the subject of legal procedure. Yet, while very
little has yet been done in the United States in the way of reform, it
1 'See Chief Justice Taft's report on the English system (1922) 6 Jour.
Am. Jud. Soc. 42-45, 8 A.B.A. Jour. 601; also (1911) 45 Am. L. Rev. 161, 641,
.801.
17Am. Bar Ass'n Rep. (1906) Vol. XXIX p. 395, (1910) 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388,
491; (1910) 22 Green Bag 488; (1916) 83 Cent. L. J. 394; (1914) 63 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 105, 111, 151, 273, 380, 505; (1920) 8 Calif. L. Rev. 326; Ballantine, The
Need of Procedure Reform in Illinois (1917) 1 Lll. L. Bul. 1.
is N. J. Acts 1912, Chap. 231, Sec. 32; N. J. Acts 1915, Chap. 93.
19 Col. Laws 1913, Chap. 121.
20 Ala. Laws 1915, p. 607.
21 Mich. Judicature Act 1915, p. 5.
22 Vt. Lews 1915, No. 90, See. 10.
2 Va. Acts 1916, p. 939.
24 N. Y. Civil Practice Act 1921, See. 1540; cf. Report of Board of Statutory
Consolidation, Vol. I, p. 170.
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seems as though we are on the threshold of another reforn and when-
ever it is inaugurated, that it will be the modern English system.
The Procedural Act which has been printed at the beginning of
this Article is an attempt to adapt the modern English system of legal
procedure to conditions in this country. All of the principles of re-
form alluded to above are embodied in it. However, the transition
from the code procedure to the new procedure, under formulated rules
of court, is made easy by a provision that the first rules shall be those
in operation at the present time, except as they may be inconsistent
with other provosions of the Act.25  In other words, the old rules are
handed to the Supreme Court and it is made to adopt them. This
means that there will be no sudden break or change in the legal pro-
cedure, but that the practitioners will continue to work under the
same rules with which they are familiar, only they must stop litigating
the rules and when they desire any amendments in them they must
go to the Supreme Court instead of to the legislature.
26
25 Section 2 (f).
2e The student will find It interesting to compare the reform outlined and
advocated above with the Roman Civil Law formulary procedure, where instead
of notice pleading there was no pleading at all, instead of the judges (praetor
and judex) exercising greater control they exercised entire control, and the
praetors framed the issues; instead of the abolition of reversals there was not
even an appeal. The Roman law would be regarded in this country as much
more radical than the modern English procedure, although Anglo-American
reform seems in many ways to be taking the direction of the Roman Civil
Law: yet no Anglo-American would have the temerity to say that the Roman
Law-either substantive or adjective-was inferior to the Anglo-American
law. Pound's Readings in Roman Law, 93-111; Speedy Justice in Ancient
Rome (1921) 5 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 101.
A similar interesting comparison can be made with the Hebrew Law
(1907) 41 Am. L. Rev. 715.
We have borrowed largely from the substantive law both of the Roman
Empire and of Palestine. Why should we not also borrow from the adjective
law of these countries when they have so much to offer and our own is in need
of so much?
For a complete Bibliogrophy of Procedural Reform, see Pound's Bibli-
ography (1917) 11 Ill. L. Rev. 451-463.
